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PETITION FOR REHEARING
The State of Louisiana respectfully petitions for
rehearing of the Court’s June 25, 2008 decision.
Specifically, it asks for an order (1) granting rehear-
ing and (2) setting the case for reargument.
Because Sup. Ct. R. 29.4(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a)
may apply, the Solicitor General of the United States
has been served with this Petition.
GROUNDS FOR REHEARING
Although this Court almost never grants petitions
for rehearing, this case meets the rare exception
contemplated by Sup. Ct. R. 44.1 and articulated in
Ambler v. Whipple, 90 U.S. 278, 282 (1875): If "the
omissions in the transcript on which the case was
heard are material to the decision of the case, it
presents a strong appeal for reargument."1
Section 552(b) of the National Defense Authori-
zation Act, Pub. L. No. 109-163, 119 Stat. 3136, 3263
(2006), specifies maximum sentences: "For an offense
under subsection (a) (rape) or subsection (b) (rape of a
child), death or such other punishment as a court-
martial may direct."
Before this provision, child rape was subsumed
under the Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ")
definition of rape ("an act of sexual intercourse, by
force and without consent"2), a charge punishable by
~ See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487 (1956), reh’g granted,
352 U.S. 901 (1956), affld on reh’g, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); Graver
Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 336 U.S. 271 (1949),
reh’g granted, 337 U.S. 910 (1949), affld on reh’g, 339 U.S. 605
(1950).
210 U.S.C. § 920(a) (2006).
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death at least since the 1863 Army Articles of War.3
The 1950 UCMJ reaffirmed the availability of the
death penalty for certain nonhomicide offenses
including rape--and extended military law to apply
during peacetime.
In 2006, Congress separated the rape provision
into several subsecr~ions (aggravated sexual assault,
child rape, etc.), and explicitly subjected child rape to
the death penalty. The House of Representatives
voted 374-41 to pass this law. 151 Cong. Rec.
H12242 (Dec. 18, 2005). The Senate approved it by
voice vote. 151 Cong. Rec. $14275 (Dec. 21, 2005).
This change in law was deliberate and premedi-
tated. The Department of Defense prepared a
comprehensive report recommending changes to the
UCMJ that examined the death penalty for child
rape. Dept. of DefeJase, Sex Crimes and the UCMJ:
A Report for the Joint Service Committee on Military
Justice, at 72-76, 301, available at http://www.dod.
mil/dodgc/php/docs/subcommittee_reportMarkHarvey
1-13-05.doc. The report discussed Louisiana’s child
rape law and attached Louisiana’s statute as an
appendix. Id. at 75, 599-602. When DOD submitted
its proposed changes to Congress, it highlighted the
capital child-rape provision. See Dept. of Defense,
Proposed Amendments to the UCMJ, 17, 21, available
at http://www.dod.~nil/dodgc/php/docs/HASCMeeting
42105.pdf.
After Congress adopted the DOD recommenda-
tions, the President signed Executive Order 13,447,
~ 1863 Army Articles of War, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 731, 736 (1863).
Military law did not extend to peacetime domestic offenses until
1950. Compare 1916 Army Articles of War, 39 Stat. 619, 664
with UCMJ, 64 Stat. 107, 140 (1950).
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which specifically implemented the child-rape capital
provision. 72 Fed. Reg. 56,179 (Sept. 28, 2007). Now,
Rule for Courts-Martial 1004(c)(9) (2008) and Manual
for Courts-Martial, Part IV, Paragraph 45 (2008),
4
directly allow for the death penalty for child rape.
Thus, both political branches have recently and
affirmatively authorized the death penalty for child
rape. Such a clear expression of democratic will, at
the very least, calls into question the conclusion that
there is a "national consensus against" the practice.
Kennedy v. Louisiana, No. 07-343, slip op. 23 (June
25, 2008).
Respondent regrettably did not know of this
Federal provision. This was a significant error, for
which Respondent accepts full responsibility. Re-
spondent first became aware of Section 552(b) from a
legal "blog" that attracted subsequent commentary.~
Respondent’s mistake, however, should neither
inhibit the Court’s work nor diminish its fealty to the
Constitution. Section 552(b) is directly relevant, if
not essential, to the Questions Presented. And
the Court’s opinion answering those questions is
factually erroneous without reference to it. Absent
4Exec. Order No. 12,460, 49 Fed. Reg. 3,169 (1984), "amended
the Manual for Courts-Martial to provide a new procedure for
capital cases." United States v. Curtis, 32 M.J. 252, 257 (C.M.A.
1991). This new procedure, set forth in R.C.M. 1004, and
upheld in Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748 (1996), requires
courts-martial to unanimously find at least one aggravating
factor before imposing death. One of these factors, R.C.M.
1004(c)(9)(A), specifically authorized the death penalty for the
rape of a child under the age of 12. It has remained unchanged
since its inception in 1984.
5 See posting of CAAFlog to CAAFlog, http://caaflog.blogspot.
corn/(June 28, 2008, 18:25 EDT).
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rehearing, a federal law may be invalidated without
argument and briefing. The State of Louisiana
therefore respectfully, and humbly, submits that
rehearing is warranted.
REHEARING IS WARRANTED IN LIGHT
OF     THE     FACT     THAT     CONGRESS
RECENTLY AUTHORIZED THE DEATH
PENALTY FOR THE RAPE OF A CHILD
This Court’s decision was grounded in two
rationales: (1) "a national consensus against capital
punishment for the crime of child rape," slip op. 23;
and (2) this Court’s "independent judgment, that the
death penalty is not a proportional punishment for
the rape of a child." Slip op. 35.
The decision did laot quantify which factor, if any,
predominated, instead stating that the first one was
"entitled to great weight." Slip op. 23. If, as the
State of Louisiana believes, Section 552(b) calls
into question the national consensus found by this
Court, the question arises whether the second factor,
standing alone, justifies an Eighth Amendment
holding that supplants the will of not only the several
States, but of the Federal Government as well.
Furthermore, the existence of Section 552(b) may
require this Court to examine whether the two
factors are hermetically sealed. The Court may well
decide that what is disproportional is a function, at
least in part, of what is recently authorized by
legislatures. Because this Court was not presented
v~ith all of the evidence of recent legislative
enactments, its "independent judgment" was not fully
informed.
5
In any event, were this Court to rest its decision
more heavily on disproportionality, the opinion may
need to be modified with respect to both Questions
Presented. For example, this Court held that "the
death penalty should not be expanded to instances
where the victim’s life was not taken." Slip op. 26-27.
But under a proportionality analysis, there may well
be nonhomicide crimes so heinous that the death
penalty is an appropriate response. Cf. Dissent slip
op. 1 (Alito, Jo, dissenting) (specifying some possible
circumstances). This Court did not have occasion
to examine the myriad circumstances relevant to
a proportionality calculation because it found a
national consensus against the death penalty for all
forms of child rape. But if that social consensus is
more textured as a result of the Federal statute, a
more finely grained proportionality analysis would be
required.
A. Section 552(b) Calls into Question this
Court’s Conclusion that There Is a
"National Consensus" Against the
Death Penalty for Child Rape
This Court found that six states authorized the
death penalty for child rape. Slip op. 12. It then
observed:
By contrast, 44 States have not made child rape
a capital offense. As for federal law, Congress in
the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994 expanded
the number of federal crimes for which the
death penalty is a permissible sentence, includ-
ing certain nonhomicide offenses; but it did not
do the same for child rape or abuse. See 108 Stat.
1972 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 18 U. S. C.). Under 18 U. S. C. §2245, an
6
offender is dearth eligible only when the sexual
abuse or exploitation results in the victim’s
death.
Id. at 12-13.
The Majority comprehensively analyzed whether
Georgia and Florida. had authorized the punishment.
Id. at 13-14. It then concluded: "Thirty-seven
jurisdictions 36 States plus the Federal Govern-
ment have the death penalty" but "only six of those
jurisdictions authorize the death penalty for rape of a
child." Id. at 15.
Justice Alito, joined by the Chief Justice, Justice
Scalia, and Justice Thomas, dissented: "The Court
notes that Congress has not enacted a law permitting
the death penalty for the rape of a child .... "
Dissent slip op. 13. He continued, "Congress’ failure
to enact a death penalty statute for this tiny set of
cases is hardly evidence of Congress’ assessment of
our society’s values."’ Id.
Section 552(b) calls the above analysis into
question, and demonstrates that the Court’s decision
supplants not only the will of the States, but that of
the Federal Government. While Congress has not, as
yet, applied the death penalty to child rape in the
civilian context, the recent trend (not to mention the
general parity between military and civilian law
today) indicates thal~ it very well may do so, if given
the opportunity.
That the Federal legislation, like the State
enactments, is of recent vintage underscores that the
national consensus is evolving.~ Just over a decade
~ Recent polls suggest, if anything, the national consensus
favors Louisiana’s law. E.g., Quinnipiac Univ. Polling Inst.,
7
ago, no State nor the Federal Government had a
specific statute permitting the death penalty for child
rape. Since that time, Louisiana enacted its law
(1995), followed by Georgia (1999), Montana (1997),
Oklahoma (2006), South Carolina (2006), Texas
(2007), slip op. 12, and the Federal court-martial
system (2006). This authorizing trend is just as
much part of the "evolving standards of decency" as
are practices that restrict particular punishments.7
In just fourteen years, America has decided demo-
cratically that jurisdictions governing nearly 50
million of her people may subject child rapists to the
death penalty:
Americans Oppose Same-Sex Marriage (July 17, 2008) (finding
that 55% favor the death penalty for child rape and 38% oppose),
available at http://www.quinnipiac.edu/x1295.xml?ReleaseID=
1194.
7 To be sure, no one has been executed in recent years for the
crime of child rape. But by the same token, "[n]obody has been
executed for treason since John Brown in 1859." James Wilson,
Chaining the Leviathan: The Unconstitutionality of Executing
Those Convicted of Treason, 45 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 99, 156 (1983).
That fact was not relevant to the Court’s suggestion that
treason is constitutionally punishable by death. Slip op. 26.
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Total Population
Impacted By Death
Penalty Statutes for
Child Rape
0
1995 4,378,779
2005 14,539,173;
2007 48,099,42G!
States
Punishing Child
Rape with the
Death Penalty
0
Louisiana
Louisiana,
Georgia,1°
Montana11
Louisiana,
Georgia,1~
Montana,
Oklahoma,
South Carolina,
Texas, 17
Armed Forces
s U.S. Census Bureau, Time Series of Louisiana Intercensal
Population Estimates by County: April 1, 1990 to April 1, 2000
(2002), available at http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/2000s/
vintage_2001/CO-EST2001-12/CO-EST2001-12-22.html.
9 Louisiana population in 2005 was 4,495,670. U.S. Census
Bureau, Annual Estima~es of the Populations of the United
States, Regions, States, and Puerto Rico: April 1, 2000 to July 1,
2007 (2007), available at http://www.census.gov/popesffstates/
NST-ann-est.html.
~o Georgia population i~t 2005 was 9,107,719. Id.
11 Montana population i.n 2005 was 935,784. Id.
~ Louisiana population in 2007 was 4,293,204. Id.
~ Georgia population i~ 2007 was 9,544,750. Id.
~ Montana population in 2007 was 957,861. Id.
~ Oklahoma population in 2007 was 3,617,316. Id.
~ South Carolina population in 2007 was 4,407,709. Id.
~ Texas population in 2007 was 23,904,380. Id.
~s There were 1,374,200 active-duty members in 2007. Office
of Mgmt. & Budget, Budget of the United States Government,
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Whatever may be said about State legislative
trends, Congress and the President, representing all
citizens and States of the Union, have decided that
child rape is subject to capital punishment. At the
very least, any conclusion that a prohibitory national
consensus exists must overcome the burden of
showing that there exists a better way to decide
democratically than that embodied in Article I,
section 7 of our Constitution. Such a showing is
possible, if at all, only with reargument.
B. This Court’s Decisions Examining
Whether Particular Death Penalty
Practices Violate the Eighth Amend-
ment Have Consistently Examined
Federal Practice
This Court has consistently examined federal law
when evaluating the "evolving standards of decency."
For example, Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280, 291 (1976), examined national legislative trends
on mandatory sentencing, and specifically noted that
the "Federal Government had made death sentences
discretionary for first-degree murder .... " Likewise,
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 820 (1991), looked
to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to determine
whether the Eighth Amendment prohibited victim-
impact evidence. Later, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 567 (2005), examined the Federal Death Penalty
Act of 1994 regarding juveniles. More recently, Baze
v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1527 (2008), surveyed both
Fiscal Year 2008, DOD Military Personnel Active and Reserve
Forces, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy
2008/pdffappendix/mil.pdf. This number is conservative, since
the UCMJ applies to far more than simply active-duty personnel.
10 U.S.C. § 802 (2006).
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state and federal law when evaluating the con-
stitutionality of lethal injection.
Section 552(b) alsc, reveals why this case does not
have a "close[] resemblance" to Enmund v. Florida,
458 U.S. 782 (1982). Slip op. 22. In Enmund, the
Federal statute, along with Colorado’s, "preclude[d]
the death penalty" under the circumstances of that
case, 458 U.S. at 7’91 (emphasis added), whereas
Section 552(b) authorizes the death penalty for child
rape.
The better analo~i is therefore Tison v. Arizona,
481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987), which limited Enmund by
permitting the death penalty for felony-murder
where the nonhomic:[de offense was committed with
"reckless indifference to human life." In so deciding,
the Court specifically cited Federal law authorizing
such penalties. Id. at 153-54. ("Two jurisdictions
require that the defendant’s participation be
substantial").
C. Military Law Is Deeply Relevant
to Interpretation of the Eighth
Amendme~t
This Court has looked to military law to interpret
the Eighth Amendment since at least 1879.
Wilkersoa v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 133-35 (1879),
contained an extensiive discussion of military prac-
tice, citing not only the Articles of War but also
military treatises. That discussion led the Court to
conclude that "the authorities referred to are quite
sufficient to show that the punishment of shooting"
did not violate "the eighth amendment." Id. at 134-
35. Later, Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 275
(1972) (Brennan, J., concurring), referred to the
practice of "review[i~g] various treatises on military
law" when seeking societal trends.
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While not an Eighth Amendment case, Loving,
supra, upheld the President’s constitutional authority
to specify aggravating factors. Those factors per-
mitted the death penalty for rape when the victim
was under the age of 12. R.C.M. 1004(c)(9). R.C.M.
1004 "was drafted in an effort to accommodate" Coker
v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). United States v.
Straight, 42 M.J. 244, 247 (C.A.A.F. 1995). The
current Manual for Courts-Martial similarly ac-
knowledges that Coker "leaves open the question of
whether it is permissible to impose the death penalty
for the rape of a minor by an adult." M.C.M., A23-14.
Congress, apparently aware that this Court upheld
the military capital sentencing regime, determined
that death sentences were constitutionally appro-
priate for child rape. Accordingly, in 2006, it stated a
national commitment to this belief in Section 552(b).
II. REHEARING IS APPROPRIATE EVEN
IF OTHER GROUNDS SUFFICE TO
JUSTIFY    THE    COURT’S CLOSELY-
CONTESTED DISPOSITION
The State of Louisiana does not doubt that it is
possible, even with the existence of Section 552(b), for
this Court to reach the same disposition on rehearing
as it did on June 25. But that is not the test.19
Rather, rehearing is warranted where, as here,
substantial grounds not previously presented exist.
This test serves several important goals. It pro-
tects the public’s trust that the Court has before it all
relevant information before reaching a final decision.
19 The Court has granted rehearing petitions after a decision
on the merits on at least 22 occasions. Eugene Gressman et al.,
Supreme Court Practice 815-18 (9th ed. 2007).
12
It also safeguards the perception of fairness, under-
scoring that the Court’s decisions in momentous
cases will not be finalized for technical and proce-
dural niceties. Substantively, it ensures that the
Court’s final decision accurately reflects the state of
facts and the law, permitting its Members to grapple
with new evidence and its implications for the
rationales underlying their decision. And it ensures
that the Court hear from the Federal Government
before its law is set aside by this Court.
Indeed, if a majority of this Court believes that the
second factor (its independent judgment) alone justi-
fied the decision, that view would militate for, not
against, rehearing. This Court would then be subor-
dinating, perhaps f~,r the first time, the "national
consensus" factor to the Court’s independent judg-
ment. Such a rule would have tremendous implica-
tions for state and federal punishment regimes.
Rehearing ensures that, before this Court follows this
path, it has before it a fully developed factual and
legal record in a concrete case.
Furthermore, rehearing would promote the guid-
ance function of this Court. Legislatures could then
create punishment systems in light of this Court’s
new pronouncement about this second factor.
If, conversely, this Court were to deny rehearing, it
would sow confusion about the proper weighting of
the "national consensus" and "independent judgment"
factors. It would create doubt about whether recent
legislative acts can ever inform this Court’s "inde-
pendent judgment." And denial would cast uncer-
tainty over military law’s relevance to the Eighth
Amendment.
Rehearing, moreover, would inform consideration
of the second Questic, n Presented. Recent legislative
13
action is relevant in assessing whether a specific
statute’s narrowing provisions offend a national con-
sensus or are a disproportionate response.
Finally, the Court’s June 25 decision invalidates a
federal statute without argument. There is no obvious
way to read the decision that maintains Section
552(b). Military courts, for example, have applied
Coker without entertaining any notion that courts-
martial are exempt from this Court’s Eighth Amend-
ment pronouncements regarding civilians. See United
States v. Clark, 18 M.J. 775, 776 (N-M.C.M.R. 1984).
This Court has not hesitated to hear from the United
States before one of its laws is set aside, and should
not do so now.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, this Petition should be granted.
Alternatively, the Court may wish to first seek the
views of the Solicitor Gepe~al of the United States.
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